North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 7
Number 2 Volume 7, Number 2

Article 3

4-1-1976

Tightening Legal Contraints on Professionals
William S. Stewart

Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
Stewart, William S. (1976) "Tightening Legal Contraints on Professionals," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 7 : No. 2 , Article
3.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol7/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.

Stewart: Tightening Legal Contraints on Professionals

TIGHTENING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON
PROFESSIONALS
WILLIAM S. STEWART*

Exclusivity is a prominent and paradoxical feature of human behavior. Although man is a social creature vulnerable to isolation, he strives
to establish a variety of systems designed to shut out other men who are
unwanted. In early days his exclusionary instinct focused on geographical territories. In modern times, with the proliferation of occupations,
he has found new outlets for the expression of this impulse.
Exclusivity in occupations is achieved in a number of ways. To
follow a trade, hold a position, engage in a business, or practice a
profession, membership may be required in an association, such as a
union, a guild, or a professional society; educational attainment may be
required, such as high school diploma, a college degree, or a postgraduate degree; a license may be required from the state. Whatever the
requirement, it is a barrier to entry which prevents those on the outside
from competing with those on the inside.
Exclusivity in occupations usually permits those on the inside td
exercise some control over both the nature of the barrier and trade
practices within the barrier. There is thus a dual effect on
competition-the number of competitors is restricted and competitive
behavior interse is restrained.
Public policies in opposition to exclusivity in occupations have developed. Constitutional protections accorded the individual-freedom of
belief, speech and association, due process and equal protection-as
well as the antitrust laws place limits on barriers and constrain behavior
within barriers. This paper examines some of the doctrinal developments in constitutional and antitrust law, and the applications thereof,
relative to the barriers to admission that professions may erect and the
controls they may exert over the competitive behavior of their members.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

ON BARRIERS

To qualify as a professional, one may need not only special knowledge but also ,a good moral character. Reputation is what people say
about you; character is what you are, and a part of what you are is your
set of beliefs. In determining your character, how far may a licensing
board go in probing your beliefs?
* William S. Stewart is a Professor in the School of Business Administration at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina. This research was
supported by the Institute of Applied Economics and Business Research.
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In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,' an applicant for a license to
practice law had been refused. In addition to passing a bar examination, California law required that an applicant must be of "good moral
character" and no person certified "who advocates the overthrow of the
Government of the United States or of this state by force, violence, or
other unconstitutional means . . . ." The applicant, to satisfy the
burden of proof placed on him, offered substantial evidence in the form
of testimonials from forty-two individuals, including a Catholic priest, a
Jewish rabbi, lawyers, doctors, professors, businessmen and social workers, that he had met these two criteria. While no evidence of bad
character or advocacy of forceful overthrow was adduced, the applicant
persistently declined to answer questions concerning his political opinions or associations; including the question of his membership in the
Communist Party. The Supreme Court, in reversing the California
court, held that the denial of admission to the bar was based on the
applicant's failure to satisfy the two criteria rather than his refusal to
answer questions, and that a denial of admission based on these grounds
violated the applicant's due process and equal protection rights because
there was no evidence in the record which rationally justified such a
conclusion.
If Konigsberg felt he had won, his sense of victory was short lived, for
on remand, instead of admitting him to practice, the California court
ordered new hearings.
In the second Konigsberg case, 2 the Supreme Court was presented
squarely and unavoidably with the issue of whether a bar applicant has a
constitutionally protected right to refuse to answer questions about his
present and past membership in the Communist Party; because the
second denial of admission by the California court had been based on
the ground that the applicant's refusal to answer had obstructed a full
investigation into his qualifications. Mr. Justice Harlan, who had dissented in the first Konigsberg case, answered the issue adversely to the
applicant in his opinion for the Court's majority of five.
"At the outset," Mr. Justice Harlan wrote, "we reject the view that
freedom of speech and association . . ., as protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes,' . . . ."I Rather, when these
freedoms are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers,
a reconciliation by weighing the respective interests must be undertaken.
In the resulting weighing process, the Court found the balance in favor
of the state's interest "in determining the fitness of applicants for
1. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
2. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
3. 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
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membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this country's legal and political institutions."
Konigsberg passed the bar examination in 1953; his first Supreme
Court case and seeming victory was decided in 1957; the final defeat of
his effort to surmount the barrier was recorded in 1961.
Sara Baird graduated from Stanford Law School in 1967. She took
and passed the Arizona bar examination. Her moral character was
flawless. In response to a question on her application for admission to
practice, she listed all organizations with which she had been associated
since she was sixteen years of age. None of these organizations was
objectionable. To Question No. 27, which asked if she had ever been
a member of the Communist Party or any organization "that advocates
overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence" she
replied, "Not Applicable." This reply was taken by all the parties to be
a refusal to answer, thus presenting the constitutional question. Her
denial of admission to practice was affirmed by the Arizona court. In
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,4 the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona
court and held that the applicant's first amendment rights had been
violated. In a close decision, Mr. Justice Black speaking for the Court,
in an opinion concurred in by four of the justices, said ". . .it is
sufficient to say we hold that views and beliefs are immune from bar
association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an
applicant from the practice of law."
Does Baird overrule Konigsberg? Not expressly, but since Baird, in
1971, the Supreme Court has not been presented with the issue of states
refusing to admit applicants to practice because they declined to answer
questions relating to their beliefs about government and their affiliations
with organizations suspected of advocating the overthrow of government
by force. 5 Thus the rule of Baird, as formulated by Mr. Justice Black,
becomes a first amendment constraint on the barrier which may be
erected to bar individuals from the practice of a profession:
The First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State
from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely
because he is a member of a particular political organization or because he holds certain beliefs. Similarly, when a State attempts to
make inquiries about a person's beliefs or associations, its power is
limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state inquiries
into these protected areas . . .discourage citizens from exercising
rights protected by the Constitution.
When a State seeks to inquire about an individual's beliefs and associations a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is
4. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
5. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971), was decided the same day as Baird.
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And whatever
necessary to protect a legitimate state interest ....
justification may be offered, a State may not inquire about a man's
views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right or
benefit because of what he believes. (Citations omitted).6
Another constitutional constraint is found in the fourteenth amendment. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of the State of New
Mexico,7 an applicant was denied permission to take the bar examination, a prerequisite to admission to practice, on the ground that he had
failed to demonstrate he had "good moral character." Far from refusing to answer questions, the applicant had supplied detailed information
about himself, including: two arrests in 1934 on "suspicion of criminal
syndicalism," an arrest in 1940 for violating the Neutrality Act of 1917,
membership in the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940, and the use of
aliases from 1934 to 1937. He had entered the University of New
Mexico law school in 1950 and sought to take the bar examination
scheduled for February, 1954.
The Court was unimpressed by his arrest record. It said "[t]he mere
fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value
in showing that he engaged in any misconduct." His use of the alias
Rudolph Di Caprio to foreclose anti-Semitism and enable him to secure
a job during the depression of the 1930's was not indicative of a bad
character some twenty years later. His membership in the Communist
Party as a young man in the midst of the country's greatest depression
was no bar when contrasted with the exemplary life he had led since
abandoning his affiliation. A unanimous Court held that there was no
evidence in the record which rationally justified a finding that the applicant was morally unfit to practice law.
The constitutional constraint was formulated by Mr. Justice Black in
the following terms:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from
any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A State can require high standards of qualification, such as
good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an
applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a
Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in
applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an
applicant when there is no basis for their findings that he fails to meet
6. 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971).

7. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.
(Citations omitted)."
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from making invidious
discriminations in the treatment of persons subject to its jurisdiction.
When a state grants some and denies others a license to engage in an
occupation, it is discriminating. In order for the discrimination to be
legal, the licensure law must be fair on its face and it must be fairly
applied. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,' a statute prohibiting
laundries in wooden buildings without a license was held to be invalidly
applied when non-Chinese applicants were consistently granted licenses
while Chinese applicants were consistently denied.
The Supreme Court has sometimes found gross discrimination falling
short of invidiousness. For example, in Kotch v. Board of River Port
Pilot Commissioners,1" Louisiana law required that seagoing vessels
sailing between New Orleans and foreign ports be navigated through the
Mississippi approaches by pilots who were state officers, appointed by
the Governor only upon certification of a State Board of River Pilot
Commissioners, thenclves pilots. The complainants, with fifteen years
or more experience piloting vessels whose pilotage was not governed by
the law in question over the same waterways, were denied appointment
as state pilots. Qualified in every way, except for a six months apprenticeship under an incumbent, they alleged that the incumbents, having
unfettered discretion, selected only relatives and friends as apprentices.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that considering the
entirely unique institution of pilotage in the light of its history in
Louisiana and elsewhere, the pilotage law and its application did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
While in Kotch the Equal Protection Clause lacked the vigor to limit
a barrier based on nepotism, it showed remarkable new strength in In re
Griffiths1 to strike down a rule of the Connecticut Bar Examining
Committee which excluded resident aliens from the practice of law. Fre
Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United
States in 1965, married a citizen in 1967, and became a resident of
Connecticut. After her graduation from law school, she applied for
permission to take the bar examination. She was found qualified in all
respects except that she was not a citizen of the United States, and for
that reason permission was refused. Noting that classifications based on
alienage are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny, the
Court held that the State had not carried its burden of justifying the
8. 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
9. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

10. 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
11. 413 U.S.717 (1973).
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necessity of the classification to accomplish its substantial interest in
assuring that attorneys-at-law are qualified by character and general
fitness. The classification was invidious and, thus, unconstitutional.
ANTITRUST CONSTRAINTS ON PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR

When the subject shifts from barriers to practices within barriers, we
find that the antitrust laws are the favored instruments of public policy
12
'in the attempt to control anticompetitive behavior by professionals.
Even though eighty-five years were to elapse between the enactment of
the Sherman Act 3 and a definitive decision that the practice of a
profession is a "trade" within its meaning, this statute had begun to
prove effective against some forms of professional restraints. Professional restraints invariably originate with the professional association;
thus the requirement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, that there be
concerted action, is easily met. The more difficult question is whether
the restraint is unreasonable, for the restraint often takes the form of a
rule of ethics. The task of the Court is to separate unreasonable trade
restraints from reasonable rules of ethics, and the process of defining criteria through developing case law has only recently begun.
The long held doubts that the antitrust laws did not apply at all to the
professions likely retarded the development. In the earlier cases the
courts dealt with gross examples of trade restraints, and, in general,
were simply willing to apply the label of unlawful trade restraint without
any extended analysis of the difference between a trade restraint and a
rule of ethics.
A rule of medical ethics was judicially examined in United States v.
American Medical Ass'n.'4 There, a group of government employees
in the District of Columbia had organized to obtain medical care for
themselves and their familes by paying dues to a corporation which
employed a staff of doctors who were compensated by salary. The
American Medical Association and its constituent society in the District
of Columbia regarded with disfavor the "salary-for-service" instead of
the traditional "fee-for-service" arrangement adopted by the group plan.
In order to destroy the plan's effectiveness, the medical society sought to
apply a rule of ethics to expel participating doctors from membership in
the society and thereby exclude them from practicing in the area hospitals. The hospitals' accreditation depended on their admitting only
physicians in good standing with the medical society. Thus hospitals
12. For an example of a constitutional constraint of anticompetitive behavior, see
Firestone v. First Dist. Dental Soc'y, 59 Misc.2d 362, 299 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct.
1969), noted in 48 Geo. L.J. 646 (1970).
13. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7

(1970).
14. 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), all'd 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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would not admit salaried doctors to their staffs if their accreditation
were thereby threatened, and doctors would not accept salaried employment if they could not practice in hospitals.
The rule of ethics made it unprofessional (and hence grounds for
expulsion) for a physician to dispose of his services under conditions
"which interfere with reasonable competition among the physicians of
a
community." Clearly, to the society, underbidding or accepting "inadequate" compensation interfered with "reasonable competition." But
absent from its case was any proof that the salaries received by the
group plan physicians were inadequate to assure good medical services.
The evidence indicated that the effect of the use of salaried practitioners
might determine who provides the medical service, but it did not indicate any reduction in the quality of that service. While recognizing that
professional organizations may establish standards for "self-discipline
and control," the court thought there was a real difference in legal
consequences when the use of the standards was directed towards the
destruction of competing professional or business organizations.
In the Supreme Court, while the conviction of the American Medical
Association and the Medical Society of the District of Columbia was
upheld, the resolution of the issue of whether the practice of a profession
is a "trade" within the meaning of the statute was deferred, for the
Court found that the group health plan was a sufficient commercial
venture in itself to make it a "trade," and the activities of the Association and Society were therefore illegal when they sought to restrain it.
The Federal Trade Commission had occasion to deal with the question of the practice of a profession as a "trade," and the validity of
professional behavior which restricted competition, in Community
Blood Bank of the Kansas City Area, Inc. 5 Prior to 1955, the blood
needs of the Kansas City area were supplied primarily by hospital blood
banks, under the supervision of the staff pathologists. The patient who
received blood was given the option of replacing the blood or paying a
"responsibility" fee. A need for a community blood bank had been
voiced.
In 1955, a commercial blood bank was established in the community.
The pathologists in the area were opposed to commercial blood banks
and set about to destroy the new entrant by organizing a nonprofit
15.

70 F.T.C. 728 (1966), rev'd on other grounds 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969).

Although the Federal Trade Commission's complaint failed because the Commission

lacked jurisdiction over the nonprofit corporations involved in the conspiracy, the

Department of Justice was more successful in its Sherman Act action against The
College of American Pathologists in which the association consented to the entry of a
decree which in effect enjoined it from conspiring to monopolize laboratory services
involving human tissue and materials. U.S. v. College of American Pathologists, 1969
Trade Cas. 87,022 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
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community blood bank and prevailing on the local hospitals to boycott
the commercial bank. The justification for the opposition to commercial banks was based on two grounds: (1) that it was immoral to traffic
in human blood, and (2) that the blood of commercial banks, often
obtained from a segment of society that is motivated by poverty to sell
its blood, was not as safe as blood from noncommercial sources. With
respect to the first ground, the Commission was of the opinion that
moral belief generally is not a valid basis for concerted action aimed at
the destruction of a trade or business. The particular method of attack
was the group boycott, a method usually treated as a per se violation of
the anti-trust laws. Condemnation of this method in these circumstances does not necessarily foreclose all group action; for example, the
doctors might have assembled to petition the government for a law
which would have effectuated their goal, aa provided their zeal was kept
within reaonable bounds. 17 With respect to the second ground, a very
delicate issue was presented. When physicians have said that something
is medically unsafe, who is to contradict them? Lay analysis may show
that the medically approved regimen is the one most likely to enhance
the market power of physicians' services, but it cannot show that another, more economically efficient, regimen is as medically safe or safer.
Thus, the Commission was unwilling to interfere with an individual
doctor's choice of treatment; but, because the National Institutes of
Health had prescribed standards and licensed this particular commercial
blood bank, and because the doctors themselves had approved the use of
commercial blood in emergencies, the Commission felt it proper to order
a termination of the group boycott.
The Commission, like the Supreme Court in American Medical
Ass'n, thought it unnecessary to decide whether the practice of a profession is a "trade" for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act or for its
own purposes in enforcing the Federal Trade Commission Act, for it
was of the opinion that the process of acquiring, processing and supplying blood to hospitals, when performed by a properly licensed blood
bank, did not constitute the practice of medicine.
The issue of a profession as a "trade" was finally resolved in 1975 in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.'8 There, a lawyer had sought legal
services in connection with the purchase of a home. He approached
numerous lawyers in Fairfax County, Virginia, only to find none who
would quote him a fee less than 1% of the value of the property involved.
This minimum fee was incorporated in a schedule adopted by the
16. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).

17. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
18. -

U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
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Fairfax County Bar Association. Adherence to minimum fees was
secured through two cannons of ethics, one which forbade solicitation
and another which forbade encroachment on other lawyers' employment; for the Committee on Legal Ethics had ruled that intentionally
and regularly undercutting the fee schedule was a violation of these
cannons which could lead to disciplinary action.
Ruling unanimously that the practice of a profession is a "trade"
within the meaning of the Sherman Act, the Court said:
The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public service aspect of professional practice controlling in determining whether § 1 includes
professions. Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption as
that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose. (Citations
omitted). 19
Nor did the Court spend much time analysing the ethical claim. The
associations had seen price cutting as a form of solicitation and encroachment on other lawyers' established clientel, and the minimum
fee schedule was the countermeasure. The Court saw the minimum fee
schedule as price-fixing, aggravated by the monopoly of legal services
granted lawyers by licensure, and consequently did not address the
distinction between a proper rule of ethics and an unreasonable trade
restraint.
CONCLUSION

Legal constraints on the anticompetitive aspects of professionalism
are tightening. While constitutional doctrines are directed primarily
towards the elimination of arbitrariness in the admission process and
have had little effect on the supply and price levels of professional
services, the first amendment has the potential of making a material
impact on professional economics by limiting or invalidating restrictions
on advertising.20 But the development in the law that has the most
economic significance is the bringing of professional trade practices under the strictures of the Sherman Act. Under the authority of Goldfarb,
judicial inquiry can now be made into the reasonableness of professional
restrictions on advertising, solicitation, encroachment and other practices normally unrestricted in a competitive market. Out of this inquiry,
in the manner of the common law, will come a new accommodation
between the roles of ethics in professional regulation and the public
policy of competitive markets embodied in the antitrust laws.
19. -

U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2013 (1975).

20. See Terry v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1975); cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a Virginia statute prohibiting the advertising of abortion services).
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